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  "map_content": "- **Akerlof (1970), \"The Market for Lemons.\"** Asymmetric information can cause adverse selection: bad products drive out good, and markets can unravel entirely. This is the formal proof that deception is not moral failure but an equilibrium outcome of information structure.\n- **Spence (1973) & Stiglitz \u2014 signaling and screening.** The market's *response* to asymmetry (warranties, credentials, brands) is itself costly and manipulable. Signals can be faked; screening can be gamed.\n- **Akerlof & Shiller (2015), *Phishing for Phools.*** The decisive move: competitive markets don't merely permit manipulation, they *select for* it. Any exploitable human weakness is a profit opportunity that competition guarantees someone will seize. Free markets have a \"phishing equilibrium.\"\n- **Behavioral foundations (Kahneman, Thaler, Ariely).** Deception works because cognition is exploitable \u2014 bounded rationality, present bias, framing effects, and defaults are all attack surfaces.",
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